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Countervailing actions are likely to be a poor instrument for
limiting subsidies for the same reason that antidumping actions
are likely to be a successful way to support cartelization. To
strengthen disciplines on countervailing measures would be
meaningless without narrowing the definition of dumping and
strengthening disciplines on antidumping procedures.
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The Uruguay Round Negotiating Groups on limits on what can be expected from a subsidy
countervailing and antidumping procedures code. For the same reason, antidumping actions
share many common issues. This is not acciden- are likely to be a successful way to support
tal, contends the author, but mirrors the way cartelization.
import-competing firms have become the
driving force of antidumping and countervailing For many economists, first-best policies rely
procedures set up under the Tokyo Round. on self-disciplines on subsidies. This goal is
politically difficult to achieve. The price paid to
The cases initiated since 1980 by the United get wider supporl for stricter disciplines on
States and the European Community illustrate subsidies seems to be to tolerate countervailing
what Tumlir has called the "tempting accommo- procedures and impose strong disciplines on
dation" in lawmaking: ill-defined (economicaly their use.
and politically ambiguous) laws producing "do-
something" regulations with unexpected long- However, to strengthen disciplines on
term effects. The result in this case is a funda- countervailing measures would be meaningless
mental imbalance in the use of the anddumping without narrwing the currently pervasive
and subsidy codes. U.S. and EC firms have definition of dumping and strengthening disci-
increasingly used countervailing and antidump- plines on antidumping procedures. This is
ing procedures as a protectionist tool against the related to the fact that U.S. and EC finns have
same few industries. increasingly used antidumping procedures as a
substitute for countervailing actions.
Countervailing actions are likely to be a
poor instrument for limiting subsidies for The author underlines the importance of
economic reasons inherent in the profit-maxi- disciplines in antidumping procedures by noting
mizing behavior of the complaining firms - not the links between antidumping, safeguard
necessarily because of poorly designed provi- propedures, and the Multifibre Arrangement.
sions in the code. Economic forces impose
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Siinry
This paper starts by noting that two Uruguay Round Negotiating Groups
-the one in charge of countervailing procedures and the one in charge of
antidumping procedures- have many comon issues.
First, it shows that such a similarity is not accidental, but mirrors
the way import-competing firms are using antidumping and countervailing
procedures they have been able tc capture since the Tokyo Round. This capture
is the logical consequence of a fundamental imoalance in both the Tokyo Anti-
dumping and Subsidy Codes which have allowed the devolution to the import-
competing firms of some basic rights states usually exert in trade policy.
Second, the paper looks at the US and EC countervailing and anti-
dumping cases initiata4 since 1980 and shows how firms have used thwse rights
for targeting the same few industries with the two procedures. More
importantly for the Uruguay Round negotiators, the EC and US firms have
increasingly used antidumping procedures as a substitute to countervailing
actions.
Third, it shows that countervailing actions are a poor instrument for
limiting subsidies because of economic reasons inherent to the profit-
maximization behavior of the complaining firms, not necessarily because of
badly designed provisions in the Code. This result is crucial because it
shows there are limits imposed by economic forces on what can be expected from
a Subsidy Code. The same economic argument shows why antidumping actions are
likely to be a successful means to support cartelization.
Lastly, the paper looks at alternatives to the present dominant role
of import-competing firms. The concept of "actionability" may lead to more
direct intervention of states in CATT disciplines. However, the Uruguay Round
cannot escape the need to reexamine the role of firms in the antidumping and
countervailing procedures. The firms' ability to substitute between anti-
dumping and countervailing procedures has an important consequence for the
negotiators; the crucial balance to be addressed is not the balance between
disciplines on subsidies and disciplines on-countervailing procedures, but the
balance between disciplines on subsidies and disciplines on antidumping
procedures.
The conclusion of the paper underlines the centr.;l role of the
disciplines in antidumping procedures by noting the links between antidumping,
MFA and safeguard procedures.
Introduction
The Punta del Este Declaration set up two different Negotiating
Groups for handling the Uruguay Round negotiations on "unfair" practices,
i.e., dumping and subsidizing. The Group on MTN Agreements and Arrangements
(hereafter the Antidumping Group) deals with antidumping, public procurement
and custom valuation issues. Subsidies and countervailing measures are
discussed in an ad hoc Negotiating Croup (hereafter the Subsidy Group). The
Punta del Este decision was motivated by the willingness to keep a balance
between disciplines on subsidies and rules on countervailing measures. It was
also feared that the negotiations on these topics were full of conflict -as
they were during the Tokyo Round [Winham, 19861-- and it seemed wise to
isolate them from other topics. 1/
However during the past two years of negotiations, deep links between
issues tackled by the two Groups have relentlessly emerged. Early in the
negotiations, the interpretation and application of Article 14:5 of the
"Subsidy Code" was put on the agenda of the Antidumping Group. In the same
Group, the first substantive communication --by Korea in May 1987-- concerned
a list of existing procedures to be strengthened; a few months later, half of
them were agreed as common to both Groups. In the Subsidy Group, the US
communication introduced the concept of "industrial targeting" which echoes
1/ The two last years of negotiations may have added another rationale.
Trade negotiators may perceive coalitions easier to forge and sustain when
dealing with narrowly defined topics than when they face broad issues. As
a result, they may believe it useful to keep negotiations on antidumping
issues apart from negotiations on subsidy disciplines and countervailing
rules.
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the issues of "repeated" and "input" dumping as a form of subsidizing. 1/ In
the sam Subsidy Group, the Swiss and US communications aimed at restricting
the range of industrial policies while in the Antidumping Group the Korean and
Japanese comunications underlined the recent use of antidumping actions as an
industrial policy tool: to mpose antidumping duties based on the long-run
necessity of maintaining at least one domestic producer in the importing
country is a motive close to the classical "infant-industry" argument for
subsidizing. 2/
This paper argues such a convergence of issues is not accidental. but
mirrors the way one crucial actor -the import-competing firm-- is using the
antidumping and countervailing procedures it has been able to capture since
the Tokyo Round. This capture is the logical consequence of a fundamental
imbalance in both the Tokyo Antidumping and Subsidy Codes; unlike the rest of
the GATT framework, the two Codes did not simply set up rules, but they have
allowed the devolution to the import-competing firms of some basic rights
states usually exert in trtde policy.
Firms have used these rights for establishing their supremacy irn both
procedures, as shown by the EC and US cases initiated since 1980. EC and US
firms have increasingly used antidumping procedures as a substitute for
countervailing actions, targeting the same few industries with the two
instruments. The dominant role of firms moved by profit-maximization explains
1/ Dumping can be a pure price discrimination practice. It can also be a
cross-subsidizing practice. The sales of a good in a market can be
subsidized by profits from the sales of the same good in another market or
from the sales of another good.
2/ The argument of a long-run necessity for a domestic firm has been
explicitly mentioned in several EC cases.
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two crucial characteristics of the procedures; countervailing actions are
likely to be a poor instrument for limiting subsidies, and antidumping actions
are likely to be a successful mean for cartelization.
The current negotiations are looking for alternatives to the dominant
role of import-competing firms. The concept of "actionability" may lead to
more direct intervention of the ..ates in CATT disciplines. However, the
Uruguay Round cannot escape the necessity of reexamining the role of firms.
The substitutability set up by the firms between antidumping and counter-
vailing procedures has a decisive consequence for the negotiators. The
crucial balance to be envisaged is not so much the balance between disciplines
on subsidies and disciplines on countervailing procedures, but the balance
between disciplines on subsidies and disciplines on antidumping procedures
and, subsequently, on safeguards.
Section 1. The emergence of the import-coSqeting firms as GATT actors
Both GATT Codes grant the right of lodging antidumping and counter-
vailing cases to import-competing firms which have become the quasi-exclusive
instigators of the cases. Once combined with the right of lodging, two other
rights granted by the GATT Codes to domestic firms establish them as the
driving force of the procedures.
A crucial power devolution: the right of lodging
Contracting Parties --governments- are the only actors mentioned by
GATT Articles VI and XVI. Nevertheless, Article 2:1 of the Subsidy Code ano
Article 5:1 of .he Antidumping Code both specify that "investigations hall be
normally initiated upon a written request by or on behalf of the ivdustry
affected." The cases initiated since 1980 show that public authorities have
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de facto devolved the right of lodging complaints to domestic 'irms; import-
competing firms have virtually lodged all the EC and US complaints. There are
only three or four cases --out of more than 700-- in which public authorities
--including EC Member States- have played a role at the lodging stage. I/
The other major administered protection instruments do not exhibit the same
character. Half of the cases initiated under US Section 301 since 1985 and
most of the cases under EC Regulation 288 were initiated by public authorities
without private petitioners.
That the right of lodging complaints by import-competing firms has
emerged as the predominant right in both antidumping and countervailing
procedures can be explained by two different reasons.
In the case of dumping. the reason comes f-om logic. GATT does not
provide an opinion --negative or positive-- on dumping practices per se as
shown by the laconic wording of Article VI:l: "The Contracting Parties
recognize that dumping [...] is to be condemned if it causes or threatens
material injury." To devolve the right of lodging complaints to import-
competing firms is a logical consequence of this opinion. Who can better know
the harm done by dumping -if any- than the firms facing it? That public
authorities should not lodge antidumping complaints is a logical corollary.
1/ Few figures on lodged complaints that the US and EC authorities have not
initiated are available. For instance, according to de Clerq (1988], one
half of all the complaints lodged in the EC have not been initiated.
These figures are difficult to interpret without a precise definition of
what are "complaints not initiated." They also require a careful
assessment of the reasons --formal or substantive, related to the EC
authorities or to the EC firms- for not initiating and --more
importantly-- of the effects. In particular, were the complaints not
initiated followed by renewed -and successful- efforts to bring up
similar cases?
In the case of a subsidy, the reason comes from political feasi-
bility. GATT Articles VI and XVI underline that subsidies may be beneficial
for the subsidizing country and therefore should not be banned. 1/ Only
subsidies affecting trade should be prohibited or limited. In the late 1970s,
subsidies became subject to increasing agnosticism. However, this agnosticism
faced a political inertia in some lIdustrialized Countries which discouraged
any major progress on public disciplines on subsidies in the GATT framework. 2/
The "Illustrative list" of prohibited subsidies in the Tokyo Code mirrors this
inertia. It has a very limited content. It does not include the bulk of
subsidies granted by the Industrialized Countries to traded goods, i.e.,
agricultural subsidies and export credits on manufactured goods. The first
ones are authorized since they concern primary products. The second ones are
covered by the OECD "Consensus" which allows abundant subsidies. 3/
The only way the Tokyo negotiators could solve the conflict between
skepticism and inertia was to involve firms. Import-competing firms,
allegedly better judges of the adverse effect of subsidies, were thus given
the right of lodging complaints. In other words, they were given the role of
"benevolent watchdogs" of unfair subsidizing. That public authorities do not
lodge complaints in countervailing procedures follows the inability to get
disciplines on subsidies, at the international and national level.
1/ This attitude mirrors economic ideas of the late 1940s: to subsidize was
quite fashionable among Industrialized Countries facing "reconstruction."
2/ Article 14 of the Subsidy Code imposes no effective limit on subsidizing
by Developing Countries.
3/ "Illustrative List," paragraph k, second line.
Import-competins firm: the driving force in domestic procedures
Both Codes prant two other rights to import-competing firms which
-once combined with the right to lodge complaints-- give import-competing
firms a dominant role in existing procedures.
With the right to be compensated for the injury caused by dumping or
subsidizing, import-competing firms benefit from skewed procedures. The bias
of the Tokyo Code in favor of import-competing firms is well known. Import-
competing firmJ are grnted the right to be compensated for the injury from
dumping or subsidizing, while other domestic interests are only granted the
right "to present all evidence they consider useful." 1/ The right of -
users or consumers to be "compensated" -by not imposing a duty- for the
injury caused by an antidumping or countervailing duty is ignored by the
Codes, as underlined by Finger [19881.
The "compensation" right is conditioned on "material" injury. This
conditionality has led to the introduction of a third right in the Codes -- the
"confidentiality" clause-- which specifies that "any information which is by
nature confidential [...] shall not be disclosed without specific permission
of the party submitting it." 2/ The confidentiality clause is guaranteed to
any involved party. However, it has a biased impact.
First, it de facto protects import-competing firms more than any
other party. For instance, only non-confidential versions of the complaints
are available to defendant foreign firms. That dumping margins claimed by
1/ Articles 6:1 (Antidumping Code) and 2t5 (Subsidy Code).
2/ Articles 6:3 (Antidumping Code) and 2:6 (Subsidy Code). The possibility
of disclosing information (Articles 6:4 and 2:7) is rarely used.
complaining firms -available for 1980-82 EC casce- represent 1.7 times the
dumping margins later found by the authorities suggests that the "Sufficient
evidence" required by the Codes for initiating a case is not always there.
Similarly, information on "material" injury requires crucial data from import-
competing firms to a4monstrate the causal link between dumping or subsidizing
and the injury. The confidentiality clause weakens the capacity to check this
information and the contradictory in-depth analysis of the causal link. 1/
Second, the "confidentiality" clause inhibits possible actions from
public authorities other than the offices in charge of investigating
antidumping and countervailing cases. For instance, it prohibits antitrust
authorities from assessing the impact of possible antidumping and
countervailing measures on competition in domestic markets.
That the views of foreign firms or domestic institutions cannot
balance the views of import-competing firms puts antidiAmping and counter-
vailing offices in an extremely difficult situation. These offices have to
resist constant pressures coming from domestic firms which chooaie cases to
present their requests for protection in the most efficient way and
progressively expand the scope of the procedures. As a result, it is not
surprising that there is a growing belief these offices are progressively
captured by the import-competing firms. For instance, Blinder 119881 has
criticized the US International Trade Commission approach "...that may protect
the inefficient under the guise of fair trade" and Hindley (19881 has shown
l/ It may be argued that confidentiality works in both ways. For instance,
complainants have virtually no access to data on which dumping margins are
based. However, price data are much easier to collect by import-competing
firms than data on injury done to domestic firms by foreign firms.
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how the methods of computing dumping and injury in the EC cases against
Japanese products are biased in a systematic way against foreign exporters.
To sum, import-competing firms have been able to retain a de facto
exclusive initiative in choosing cases. This tactical advantage --once joined
to the benefits of unbalanced procedures-- has given import-competing firms
considerable leverage on the procedures.
Section 2. Sector-specific ases and substitutable procedures
This Section describes how firms have used this leverage during 1980-
87. First, antidumping and countervailing procedures are generally perceived
as economy-wide instruments. The cases initiated by the EC and the US since
1980 do not corroborate this view? they target a narrow range of industries
and have a strong sector-specific impact.
Second, the two procedures are also perceived as independent of each
other. However, the cases initiated show a significant overlap between
antidumping and countervailing actions, both in the EC and the US. More
evidence suggests that import-competing firms tend to use antidumping
procedures as a substitute to countervailing actions.
Antidumping and countervailing cases are sector-specific
Table 1 shows the breakdown by industry of all the EC and US
antidumping and countervailing cases initiated between 1980 and 1987. In both
countries, one industry -steel in the US, chemicals in the EC- represents
more than 40% of all cases initiated. In both the US and EC, only three
industries represent two thirds of all cases: steel, chemicals and machinery.
The breakdown by countries targeted shows a high concentration by industry in
"Atlantic" cases --EC cases initiated against US exporters and vice versa--
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and in the US, antidumping and countervailing cases against exports coming
from MICs. 1/
Case numbers that do not take into account the trade occurring
between countries can be misleading. Exposure ratios -the ratio of the
percentage of cases initiated against a country to the share of the imports
from this country- give a better indication of how a country can be targeted
more by cases than another country. Table 1 shows that exports from Non-
Market Economies and from the non-Asian NICs are the relatively favored
targets of both EC and US procedures. 2/ Exports from Japan and the Asian
NICs share the same situation for cases initiated by the EC; the EC exports
share the same situation for cases initiated by the US.
Table 1.A shows that the US firms have adopted different attitudes in
their use of countervailing procedures against EC and non-Asian exports. On
the one hand, the US countervailing actions against exports from the non-Asian
NICs show the lowest level of sector-specificity. This does not look
contradictory with US firms acting as "benevolent watchdogs" against unfair
subsidizing since non-Asian NICs spread subsidies to all non-traditional
industries. However, it does not explain why the "watchdogs" do not
1/ The role of exchange rate variations is not clear. How can macroeconomic
shocks effect industries with a strong differentiated impact, if one
remembers that final determinations are based on fixed costs, i.e., make
the procedures sensitive to capital intensities and depreciation rates of
capital? Existing available evidence is contradictory. The US cases tend
to favor some form of relation [Balassa, 19881 while the EC cases do not
[Messerlin, 1989]. All this does not mean that exchange rates do not
introduce biases in the computations of dumping or subsidy margins.
2/ Non-Asian NICs are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Israel,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Asian NICs are: Hong Kong,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan, China.
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concentrate their actions on the highest subsidized sectors. Nogues (19881
has shown that subsidy rates on exports from Argentina and Mexico facing US
countervailing actions have varied from 0.9% to 104.6%.
On the other hand, the US countervailing actions against EC exports
do not match the most important EC subsidies, with the sole exception of
steel. 1/ There are few US countervailing actions against EC exports in
agricultural products, textiles and apparel, paper and printitg, chemicals,
machinery and transport equipment; all EC industries benefiting from sub-
stantial subsidies. 2/ This attitude is definitely not consistent with
"benevolent watchdog" behavior.
As US firms are unlikely to have two different behaviors -one for
the exports from non-Asian NICs and one for the exports from the EC- the
"benevolent watchdog" behavior does not fit available evidence.
Antidumping and countervailing procedures are substitutable
A careful examination --at the most disaggregated level- of the
goods under antidumping and countervailing actions suggests a substantial
overlap of antidumping and countervailing complaints. Table 2 concentrates on
US countervailing cases, the only ones to be sufficiently numerous to offer a
good comparison. 3/ Almost half of the cases target exactly the same goods
1/ This lack of countervailing actions cannot be explained by a lack of
lobbying since all the concerned US industries are well organized. Note
the EC steel industry was subject to many US antidumping actions as well.
2/ For evidence on the breakdown of subsidies by sector in some EC countries,
see Juttenmeier [1987] and Messerlin [1988J.
3/ The EC situation seems even stronger, if less conclusive; most of the very
few EC countervailing cases were initiated jointly with antidumping
cases.
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and countries as US antidumping cases. About one third of the countervailing
cases extend the antidumping cases by targeting new countries or by stretching
the definition of the targeted goods. The vast majority of countervailing
actions -roughly 80%- were initiated at the same time (i.e., within one
month) as the corresponding antidumping actions; 10% were initiated after the
similar antidumping actions and 10% before. 1/
The observed overlap suggests that complaining firms used one of the
two procedures for double checking and/or harassment, not for its intrinsic
features. That raises two questions.
First, is there a procedure emerging as the preferred one? Table 3
suggests the antidumping procedure. 2/ The ratio of the countervailing cases
relatively to the antidumping cases has been declining since 1984. Inter-
estingly, this decline is more marked when the steel and chemical cases are
excluded, i.e., when the overlap between countervailing and antidumping
actions is less.
Second, why is the countervailing procedure progressively deserted by
domestic firms for antidumping actions? A first explanation could be the
decrease of subsidies granted. However, there is no strong evidence of a
substantial decline of subsidies. New subsidies granted by Treasuries may
have declined, but the size of the beneficiaries has declined too. Moreover,
most of the past subsidies are loans now to be repaid. There is growing
1/ One might argue that the results depend upon the steel cases, by far the
most numerous. However, to exclude the steel cases does not change the
overall picture; there are still more common cases than totally different
ones although the magnitude of the overlap is reduced.
2/ Again, the very few EC countervailing cases suggest the same result.
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evidence that beneficiaries are not reimbbrsing the loans when due, even when
the subsidized firms have become "profitable." 1/ The absence of
reimbursement could be interpreted as a subsidy under countervailing
procedures. 2/
If not caused by the decline of subsidies, the relative decline in
the use of the countervailing procedure might be related to an intrinsic
feature of the procedure, namely the injury clause -- the benefit of which is
only granted by US law to countries comitted to phase out subsidy programs.
Countervailing actions without an injury test would increase, while actions
subject to the test would decrease. However, Table 3 shows no dissimilar
evolution for the two types of countervailing actions.
If neither caused by che subsidy evolution nor by any intrinsic
feature, the decline of countervailing actions must be related to the relative
facility and efficiency with which countervailing and antidumping procedures
can be used.
This conclusion has a crucial impact on the current negotiations. It
implies that the decisions of the Subsidy Group concerning changes in counter-
vailing rules affect. the decisions the Antidumping Group will take for
antidumping rules, and vice-versa. Antidumping and countervailing procedures
1/ In the EC, the problem is particularly acute in automobile and steel, even
when the new unanimous consent rule -in steel- that GATT wording would
call a "revolving liat of prohibited subsidies" increases the lobbying
power of some -mostly German-- firms and governments against subsidies.
2/ According to some authors [Spencer, 1988], the economic impact of
subsidies not reimbursed is nil if capital markets are perfect.
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are competitors for meeting the same demand for selective protection. 1/ To
strengthen countervailing rules will reduce the number of countervailing
cases, but it may well increase the number of antidumping actions.
Section 3. The impact of profit-mazisization on the use of the Codes
Countervailing procedures are perceived as a poor instrument to limit
subsidizing. This perception is supported by Section 2 which shows that US
countervailing actions are not concentrated on eC exports, the most subsidized
(with the exception of steel). A narrower but striking example is given by
the aircraft industry. Since 1980, there was no countervailing action by
Boeing against the A:vbus program. By contrast, there were two US
countervailing actions --or threat of-- against Brazilian producers of smaller
aircrafts.
The Tokyo Subsidy Code is usually held responsible for the poor
results of countervailing actions. This Section shows that there is a more
profound cause -profit-maximization-- which can explain why countervailing
actions are a poor instrument to limit subsidies. This result is important
because it shows there are limits -imposed by economic forces- on what can
be expected from improvements of the Countervailing Code.
1/ An aspect of the competition is the relative costs; how costly are they
for public authorities and how much should lobbies invest in them? The
less costly procedure may be the antidumping one since it does not require
a commitment from the public authorities --in terms of investigation and
measure-- as strong as the countervailing procedure. However, state
intervention may be less costly for cases initiated by an industrialized
country against a developing country. As a result, countervailing actions
against developing countries may be more likely.
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The Section also provides some evidence on two closely related
w,tters. First, profit-maximization also explains why import-competing firms
are induced to use antidumping procedures as a means for cartelization.
Second, there is a serious risk that Article VI may play a role similar to the
MultiFibre Arrangement in textiles, i.e., the legal basis relieving a few
industries from general GATT rules.
Countervailing procedures: a poor instrument for limiting subsidies
The decline of countervailing actions suggests that firms are not
"benevolent watchdogs" against subsidies. Economic theory suggests they are
profit-maximizers. As a result, one should expect that import-competing firms
will be induced to limit foreign subsidies by lodging countervailing actions
if ani only if these procedures increase their profits, including rents. The
most likely scenario for domestic firms is not necessarily the elimination of
foreign subsidies; a better alternative could be to capture a portion of
foreign subsidies by colluding with foreign firms. In such cases, import-
competing firms will not lodge countervailing actions but will look to means
for collusion.
A good illustration can be provided by the aircraft industry. The
choice Boeing might face is not only between a situation with a subsidized
Airbus and a situation with no-subsidies-and-no-Airbus. It can be between a
no-subsidy-no-Airbus ituation and a situation where Boeing could indirectly
benefit from the Airbus subsidies through market sharing and collusion. A
joint monopoly with Airbus is better for Boeing if the costs in monopoly rents
lost by Boeing --because of the survival of a subsidized Airbus- are more
than compensated by the indirect benefits Boeing can get from the subsidies
granted to Airbus. For instance, it may occur that the subsidized demand for
Airbus increases the number of engines to be produced and -if there are scale
economies large enough-- lowers the cost of engines for both Airbus and
Boeing. 1/ In other words, a crucial determinant for lodging complaints is
the possibility of sharing subsidies.
This explanation gives results which are consistent with the evidence
provided in Section 2. Profit-maximizing firms are more likely to lodge
complaints against small subsidy programs --such as those existing in
developing countries- because it is unlikely they can draw substantial
indirect benefits from such programs. For instance, the US cut-flower growers
have little to gain from collusion with foreign producers wiho do not receive
massive subsidies. Their best alternative is to eliminate foreign competitors
from the US markets by lodging countervailing actions. By contrast, import-
competing firms are more likely not to lodge complaints against large programs
-as those existing in industrialized countries- susceptible to provide
substantial spill-over effects.
Antidumping: domestic cartelization and world-wide actions
Since antidumping actions are substitutes for countervailing. actions,
their economic impact deserves some attention. There is a growing evidence
showing that antidumping actions have been widely used as a means for price
collusion in both domestic and possibly world markets.
Using the 1980-85 EC cases as an illustration, Table 4 shows the
instrumental role of antidumping actions in the enforcement of domestic
1/ For details, see Annex. In the Boeing-Airbus case, more factors can play
a role. First, planes are a substantial part of the costs of airline
companies whick. are then induced to lobby against duties. Second, Airbus
may threaten to retaliate against Boeing's countervailing action by
lodging an antidumping action. Third, Boeing may use Airbus subsidies to
get subsidies. None of these factors contradict the above reasoning.
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cartelixation. 1/ Antidumping measures are accompanied by two significant
price effects due to the massive reduction --40% three years after the year of
initiation-- of imported quantities. First, the prices charged by the eC
import-competing firms are stabilized after declining before the initiation of
the cases. Second, tne prices charged by "dumping" exporters have substan-
tially increased, relatively to both intra-EC prices and prices charged by
"nondumping" exporters. Prusa (1988] provides evidence which --although still
very partial-- suggests similar results for US cases.
Countervailing an' antidumping actions may lead to worldwide actions
because cases dealing with the same products may be initiated in various
Contracting Parties enforcing both CATT Codes. The possibility of such a
"domino" effect is supported by anecdotal evidence. For instance, half of the
39 Mexican cases initiated since the introduction of the Mexican antidumping
law concern goods closely related to those subject to countervailing and anti-
dumping cases in the EC and the US.
Table 5 presents more systematic evidence on chemical products, the
only ones to be sufficiently numerous in the four countries --the EC, US,
Korea and Mexico- considered. Only nine of the 78 products investigated in
the four couptries were subject to an action in more than one country. But
these products represent one fourth -59 of 220-- of the corresponding cases,
1/ Antidumping measures also generate large trade diversion effects,
particularly when LDC and NIC exports are affected. Moreover, rents
created by antidumping protection granted under the form of quantitative
restraints accrue to foreign firms. These rents are substantial for
exporters from Industrialized Countries, less important for LDC and NIC
exporters [Messerlin, 1989].
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i.e., products times countries involved. 1/ One may wonder why developing
country firms would participate in worldwide market agreements since they may
lack the size and motives of doing it. It is simply because some of these
firms are subsidiaries of US or EC firms. For instance, Mexican antidumping
cases may involve the subsidiaries of US and EC firms on both the complaining
or defending sides of the cases.
The long term danger of the current use of Article VI
Does the "domino" effect mean that the current use of Article VI
-if perpetuated long enough- may serve as a legal basis for relieving few
industries from the general GATT rules, as the MultiFibre Arrangement did for
textiles and apparel?
The few major industries using antidumping and countervailing actions
can be classified into two groups. First, there are industries benefiting
from other protectionist instruments; voluntary export restraints for steel
and some electronics (VCRs, TVs), quantitative restrictions for textiles and
apparel. For these industries, antidumping and countervailing actions have
helped to introduce --and later to monitor- more secure nontariff barriers.
For instance, almost all US and EC antidumping cases against steelmakers
operating in market economies were closed by reference to a "voluntary
agreement" signed or to be signed by their government with the US and EC [van
Bael, 1979]. The current use of Article VI strongly reinforces protectionist
measures already in place.
1/ The countries most frequently targeted by cases originating in two
different countries are China -twice-- East Germany, Romania, the Soviet
Union (all by the EC and US), and Japan (by the EC and Korea).
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Second, there are the iniustries using antidumping actions as a main
tool of protection; the chemical, abrasives, and --to a lesser extent-
electronic industries (informatics). Antidumping cases in these industries
constitute the bulk of protection. There are virtually no nontariff barriers
on US imports of all these products (SITC 266, 275, 51, 56 and 59) and few of
them on eC imports of "chemical materials and products, n.e.s." (SITC 59). 1/
The trade of this second group of industries can be considered trade
"managed" by antidumping and countervailing procedures. It cannot be
adequately measured by trade coverage ratios because the frequency and
concentration of the cases suggest these measures have a wider effect than the
narrowly defined trade coverages suggest. Total trade in chemicals and
abrasives represents 82 of the world trade in manufactures: this figure may
be compared to the world trade covered by the steel VERs and quotas, around
6Z, and by the MPA, 5 in apparel and 7X in textiles. A capture of Article VI
by some industries would definitely not be a minor change in the international
trade environment.
Section 4. The framework for the negotiations
This Section examines two questions. Does the approach of the
Montreal Ministerial Meeting recognize that profit-maximizing firms cannot be
the panacea for limiting subsidies and does it offer alternatives? Does it
take into account the substitutability between antidumping and countervailing
procedures?
1/ In 1986, EC imports affected by nontariff barriers represented less than
62 of total imports in the mentioned SITCs, except for SITC 59 where they
represented about 14Z. Corresponding figures for the US imports are less
than about 2X for the mentioned SITCs. Source: UNCTAD ata Base.
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The answer to the first question is yes; the answer to the second is
no. The Section shows that the substitutability between the two procedures
may undermine any strengthening of countervailing rules undertaken without a
full consideration of what will be done in the new Antidumping Code. A less
pervasive definition of dumping is necessary. Stricter disciplines on
antidumping procedures are a necessary part of a genuine balance between
disciplines on subsidies and disciplines on countermeasure rules.
"Actionability" vs "countervailability"
The Montreal Meeting framework for negotiations has been seen as a
reshuffle -or worse a complication-- of the inoperative Tokyo Round
taxonomy. Such an interpretation focuses on the introduction of the three
"baskets" of subsidies defined by the legal effects attached to them, as
suggested by the Swiss-Colombian communication: prohibited subsidies which
could be subject to unilateral countermeasures without the legal requirement
of material injury, "actionable" subsidies which could be countervailed if
they cause material injury, and "non-actionable" subsidies which could not be
countervailed, even if they cause negative effects to trading partners. 1/
However, such a pessimistic interpretation of the framework misses a
point which may Icad to substantial improvements, i.e., the distinction
between "actionability" and "countervailability." ' As the Round has
1/ The first and last baskets of subsidies would be in exclusive lists, the
second category in an "illustrative" list. All the lists would be
produced by international negotiations. However, the Swiss-Colombian
proposal specifies that negotiations on the lists should be guided by the
criteria of the subsidy's impact on trade.
2/ The distinction is mentioned at the level of the definition of the
subsidies --they can be "countervailable or otherwise actionable" or
"noncountervailable, non-actionable"- and at the remedy level --"counter-
vailing duties" are distinct from "countermeasures"-- as well.
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progressed, negotiators are more and more using the world "actionable" to
refe: to state action. As countervailing duties --and to a lesser extent
"countervailability"-- refer to actions led by firms, the increased emphasis
on the distinction suggests that the Montreal framework would no longer
consider the firms as the exclusive instrument for limiting subsidies. This
new approach --if confirmed-- could bring two positive corollaries.
First, the new Code would focus on self-disciplines for subsidies as
the two major comunications available before the Montreal Meeting --the
Swiss-Colombian and the US-- did focus, although for 4ifferent motives. The
US proposal supports self-discipline because it is an economically sound
behavior. The Swiss-Colombian cominication considers self-discipline more as
a consequence of the increasing retaliatory powers trade partners could have
against prohibited or "actionable" subsidies. 1/
Second, both proposals expand the scope of prohibitions by forsaking
traditional GATT distinctions between various types of subsidies --subsidies
on primary vs nonprimary products, export vs domestic subsidies-- and by
suggesting similar treatment for all of them. 2/ This new approach is
particularly noticeable vis-a-vis the subsidies granted by developing
countries. Although built in such a way that there is flexibility, the
1/ To rely too much on this second approach --more based on political than
economic reasons- presents the obvious risk to trigger trade disputes.
2/ In addition to the current prohibition of export subsidies, the US
approach suggests to prohibit domestic subsidies affecting either when
they exceed a specified size or amount or when they are granted to
relatively export-oriented industries. Such "high" subsidies would be
deemed to give rise to a right of compensation under GATT.
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proposed rules to be applied to developing countries are identical to the
rules proposed for industrialised countries.
Though promising, the concept of "actionability" may creatc rule
consistency problems and generate awkward situations. In the three "baskets"
pystem, prohibited subsidies are prohibited presumably because they are
considered more systematically harmful to trade than actionable or
countervailable subsidies. However, prohibited subsidies may not trigger
retaliatory actions because importing countries may consider it beneficial to
import cheaper subsidized goods. As a result, prohibited subsidies not
subject to retaliatory actions may coexist with nonprohibited subsidies
subject to countermeasures or countervailable duties.
"Actionability" will not necessarily ease international relations.
Not all importing countries will necessarily decide to retaliate against a
prohibited subsidy and not all importing countries will necessarily decide to
take a countermeasure against an actionable subsidy. Such diverging decisions
may mirror either different levels of subsidy and injury in importing
countries or differing trade policies for the same level of subsidy and
injury. This variance may generate trade disputes between importing countries
taking action and the exporting country, since the latter can argue that its
subsidy is not so harmful since other countries do not retaliate. Or it may
may result in pressures by countervailing-importing countries on noncounter-
vailing-importing countries. 1/
1/ Along the same lines, the distinction between "countervailing duties" and
countermeasures is likely to create problems. Would countervailing duties
by some importing countries trigger countermeasures by other importing
countries, or vice-ver3a?
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More disciplines on subsidies require more disciplines on antidumping
procedures
The Montreal Ministerial Meeting made no mention of a balance between
dumping and subsidy issues. So far, no delegation seems to have paid much
attention to the substitution between antidumping and countervailing
procedures. This issue involves problems related to the definitions of
subsidizing and dumping as well as to procedural mechanisms per se. What
follows will focus on the definitional problems.
One of the innovations of the Uruguay Round is the introduction of
"non-actionable" subsidies, a category of subsidies crucial for easing the
assent --from developing countries- to strengthen disciplines on public
aid. However, the ease of substituting antidumping for countervailing
procedures can make this "non-actionability" clause void.
Subsidies are likely to introduce price differences between overseas
domestic prices and export prices of the goods. This can be because of the
characteristics of the subsidy, as in the case of export subsidies. It can
also be because of the characteristics of the subsidy recipients; subsidies
are mainly granted to large firms which are more inclined to practice price
discrimination. Lastly, it can be because of the products concerned; product
differentiation increases the chances to link price discrimination and
subsidies. 1/ A good illustration of the intricate relationship between
subsidies and dumping is given by the cases initiated against exports from
Non-Market Economies. Since 1980, the EC has used only its antidumping
1/ For instance, R&D subsidies aimed at developing new products may lead to
price differentials if the technologically advanced goods are exported
while the less advanced "like-products" are sold in domestic markets.
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procedure against East-European exports; the US have initiated thirty
antidumping cases, but only four countervailing cases, against exports from
such countries.
Because they are likely to introduce or to be combined with price
discrimination practices, subsidies can easily trigger antidumping actions,
even if countervailing actions and countermeasures are prohibited, i.e., even
for "non-actionable" subsidies.
The pervasiveness of the current definition of dumping increases the
chances to introduce antidumping actions against sobsidized exports. Dumping
is supposed to be a self-defining concept; it exists each time the domestic
price of a good is higher than its export price. However, following GATT
Article VI, the Tokyo Antidumping Code has promoted an extensive notion of
dumping. Article 2:4 does consider the possibility of dumping when there is
no strictly comparable domestic price, i.e., in cases "when there are no sales
[...1 in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting
country or whers [...] such sales do not permit a proper comparison." In these
circumstances, Article 2:4 authorizes the use of proxies for overseat prices
-"constructed values"- to be compared with export prices.
"Constructed values" based on Article 2:4 introduce a crucial link
between the definitions of subsidizing and dumping. They present dumping more
as a subsidy between "like-products" than as a pure price discrimination
between identical goods. Complaints based on Article 2:4 can target any price
or cost difference related to some kind of "industrial targeting", whether it
is privately financed --as in "pure" antidumping cases-- or publicly financed
-as in "disguised" countervailing cases. Consistency between GATT texts then
imposes a choice. To ban private cross-subsidization in the Uruguay
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Antidumping Code by maintaining Article 2:4 logically implies a ban of public
cross-subsidization in the Uruguay Subsidy Code. This represents a
considerable enlargement of the definition of subsidies. For instance,
industrial targeting should be included in the list of prohibited aid.
Conversely, if one decides not to introduce industrial targeting in the
Uruguay Subsidy Code, that would require restrict;ons be imposed on the
current Article 2:4 provisions in the Uruguay Antidumping Code.
Conclusion
The Tokyo Antidumping and Subsidy Codes have made import-competing
firms the driving force of antidumping and countervailing procedures. The
cases initiated since 1980 suggest that both Codes illustrate what Tumlir
[1984] has called the "tempting accommodation" in lawmaking; ill-defined laws
often produce "do-something" regulations with unexpected effects in the long
run. 1/ The Tokyo Antidumping and Subsidy Codes are in many respects ill
defined, economically and politically ambiguous.
For many economists, first-best policies rely on self-disciplines on
subsidies. TLis goal is politically difficult to achieve. The price to be
paid to get a wider support for stricter disciplines on subsidies seems to be
to tolerate countervailing procedures and to impose strong disciplines on
1/ The Tumlir reference is even more compelling with this excerpt by which a
"Supreme" Court -namely the European Court of Justice- limited the scope
of its own review because of "complexity": "In considering these
arguments where the EC Council or the Com.ission is required to appraise
complex economic situations (as in antidumping proceedings), the Court
limits its review of such an appraisal to verifying whether the relevant
procedural rules have been complied with,..." Joint Cases 277 and
300/85. This position is similar to the Carolene case in US law.
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their use. This paper shows that to strenghthen disciplines on countervailing
procedures is meaningless without narrowing the currently pervasive definition
of dumping and strengthening disciplines on antidumping procedures. This
result is consistent with an economically sound approach which perceives
dumping more as a form of competition than anything else and antidumping
measures more as a form of protection than anything else.
It is now time to relax one assumption imposed on the paper. So far,
the paper has considered the only two procedures embodied in existing Codes.
It has ignored two crucial links, one between antidumping and MPA procedures
and one between antidumping and safeguard procedures.
Antidumping actions initiated since 1980 have intensively used two
concepts -"cumulation" and "price undercutting"- also basic ingredients in
MFA procedures. 1/ Interestingly enough, there is a recent increase in
antidumping cases in textile and apparel and no legal rules seem to prohibit
adding up MFA restrictions and antidumping measures. Any stricter use of
these concepts in post-Uruguay antidumping procedures is likely to have an
impact on the future of the MFA.
Antidumping actions are de facto the most selective instrument one
can imagine: complaints and measures can be -- and are- designed by product,
by country and by firm. No safeguard procedure will never achieve such a
refinement in selectivity. Henderson [1988] has underlined the increasing
extent of discrimination between countries in the recent -ears. To
strenghthen antidumping procedures will inevitably create pressures for
1/ I am grateful to R. Blackhurst for having suggested this relation. For
details on the concepts, sve Messerlin 1989b.
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relaxing safeguard procedures. Two questions deserve some attention. How
stricter should be the disciplines on antidumping procedures to trigger some
attempts to ease safeguards? Is it any different to "recognize" grey measures
through antidumping actions or through an agreement on safeguards? Our answer
to the second question is that it does make a difference because the
"recognition" of grey measures under antidumping measures is likely to be much
easier and extensive than under an agreement on safeguards. Our guess for the
first question is that the current antidumping procedures are so much
"superior" -from the plaintiff's point of view- to safeguard act'ions that
there is room for a massive strenghthening of the disciplines on antidumping
procedures before triggering pressures on safeguards.
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Table I.A. Breakdown of US countervailing cases by industry, 1960-1967
Case initiated lal Cases with non-negative outcomes Cbl
ItSIC Description _
Total EC Japan OlCs ANICs ONICs tOCs NMEs Total EC Japan OICs ANICs ONICs LOCs liEs I
lcl tdl t] If) (gtI tcI ldl e(e flt (gI I
1-,---.-.-...--------.-. - --.------ - -- --.---- -----.------ - ------ --.--.-...........-
Ill Agriculture thl 5.1 2.6 4.4 2.7 5.3 16.2 6.9 3.3 6.1 4.8 5.7 23.1 I
290 Ninins & quarrying
1311/2 food products 7.1 8.7 17.8 3.5 8.1 9.9 14.8 21.2 4.6 11.5
1 313 Beveroaes 1.4 4.3
1321/2 Textiles apperel 8.5 16.2 7.9 40.5 10.3 14.3 10.3 46.2
I 324 Footwer 0.8 8.9 1.8 2.7 0.9 2.3
1 331 Wood products 1.1 0.4 3.0
341 Paper products 0.6 1.8 0.4 1.1
1351/2 Chemicals 7.1 10.4 8.8 2.7 50.0 8.6 18.0 9.2 33.3
3 S34 Petolosu & col 
I 3S5 Rtuber products 0.6 2.7 0.9 0.4 1.1
I 356 Plastic products
361 Pottery & chins 0.3 0.9 0.4 1.1 
362 Clats products 1.4 1.7 2.6 0.9 2.3
369 Non-metal products 1.7 0.9 3.5 2.7 1.7 3.4 3.8
371 Iron & steel S5.4 62.6 50.0 57.8 62.2 56.1 21.6 50.0 51.1 59.0 SO.0 60.6 57.1 S0.6 15.4 66.7
372 Non-ferrous metals 1.7 1.7 4.4 1.8 2.1 1.6 6.1 2.3
381 Metal products 3.4 0.9 50.0 2.2 10.8 3.5 2.7 4.3 1.6 50.0 3.0 14.3 4.6
382 Wonelec. machinery 2.0 3.5 2.2 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.6 4.8 1.1 I
383 Electr'l machinery I
| 384 Transport 1.4 1.7 5.4 0.9 0.4 4.8
385 Scientific quip.
390 Other industries 0.6 0.9 2.7
1------------------------------------------------------------------------ - ----------------- -- ------------ ------ 1-
Total VD 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
t otal n 'or of cases 354 115 2 45 3' 114 37 4 233 61 2 33 21 87 26 3
I-------------.------------------------------------------------------------------------
Herfindahl coefficients 0.33 0.42 0.50 0.38 0.43 0.34 0.25 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.29 0.31 0.56 i
Exposure ratio. 11 1.0 1.7 0.0 0.5 0.8 2.9 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.4 0.0 0.6 0.7 3.3 1.1 2.0
Sources: US Federal Rgister. Own cowputations.
Not*s: Cal All cae.
b) All final outcomes (affirmative, suspended, terminated ...), except negative outcemes.
(el OlCs: Other Industrialized Countries, iLe., OECO Countries, except the EC and Japan.
tdO MICs: Asian New-Industrialized Countries, i.e., Hong-Kong, Korea, Malysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.
Ce) OSICs: Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuels, Israel, Portugal. Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia.
lfl LOCs: Developing Countries, including P.R. of China.
CgI NMEs: Non-Market Economies, excluding P.R. of China.
ls) Including livestock and ftlower cases.
IhI Ratio of the share In cases with respect to the share in imports.
P.A. tesserlin, Montreux, 12 January 1989
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Table 1.. 8reakdown of US antidwping cases by indu try, 1960-1967
Cases initiated [a] C"s with non,negative outcoen lbl
ISIC Description 
,_,__
Total EC Japan OICs ANICs OICS LOCs MEs Total EC Japan OlCs AllICs OHICs LOCs UIEs
Cc) Ed) tel If] to] Ec) (dc Ce) If) Ig 1
111 Agriculture Chl 3.0 6.4 2.8 22.6 3.4 7.1 3.8 25.0
M290 mining & qarrying 0.2 2.1
1311/2 Food products 2.0 8.5 2.8 6.5 1.1 3.6 1.9 5.0
1 313 Se wra. 1.2 3.9
1321/2 Textiles & apparel 1.5 7.0 2.0 6.5 1.5 6.9 10.0
324 Footwear
331 Wood products
341 Paper products 1.0 2.1 4.0 1.4 0.7 6.7 
351/2 Chemicals 11.4 10.1 1t.6 6.5 4.0 12.5 16.1 16.7 10.1 10.6 13.8 7.1 9.6 15.0 16.0
354 P*trol... & coal 0.7 2.1 3.2 3.3 0.7 5.0 4.0
355 Rubber products 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 0.4 1.2
3S6 Plastic pro&uts 0.5 1.6 0.4 1.2
361 Pottery & china
362 Mlass products 2.2 4.7 2.3 2.1 1.4 2.2 4.8 3.4 1.9
369 Hon-mtal products 3.0 3.1 4.7 2.1 2.0 4.2 3.2
371 Iron Z steel 54.0 62.0 27.9 46.8 48.0 68.1 29.0 70.0 61.0 73.5 31.0 57.1 S6.7 73.1 25.0 68.0
372 Non-ferros mtals 4.2 6.2 4.7 8.5 2.0 2.8 5.2 6.0 6.9 14.3 3.3 3.8
381 Metal prodjcts 3.5 1.6 4.7 12.0 2.8 6.5 3.4 3.4 - 16.7 3.8 5.0
382 Norelec. mehinery 3.7 3.9 7.0 6.4 1.4 3.2 6.7 3.4 1.2 6.9 7.1 1.9 5.0 8.0
383 Electr'l mchinery 4.2 20.9 2.1 14.0 4.9 27.6 3.6 13.3
384 Tranport 1.2 8.0 3.3 0.7 3.3 4.0 I
385 Scientific equip. 
390 Other industries 0.7 0.8 2.0 3.2 0.7 1.2 5.0 I
I Total DZ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 I
jTotal nuier of cases 402 129 43 47 50 72 31 30 267 83 29 28 30 52 20 25!
Herfindalh coefficients 0.31 0.41 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.48 0.18 0.52 0.39 0.56 0.21 0.37 0.37 O.55 0.17 0.50
Exposure raties Cil 1.0 1.6 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.6 0.7 11.4 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.2 0.5 9.5
Sources: US federal Register. Own coaputations.
Notes: tel All cae, except Court Remands.
bl All final outcmes (affirmative, suspended, terminated ... ), except negative outcoms.
Ccl OICs: Other Industrialized Countries, i.e., OECD Countries, except the EC and Jpn.
Cle ANICs: Asian New-industrialized Countries, i.e., Hong-Kong, Korea, lotysia. Singapore, Taiwan
,
Thailand.
Cl OllICs: Argentina, Bratil, Chile, Mexlco. Venezuela, Isre l, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavis.
tfl LOCs: Oeveloping Countries, including P.R. of Chine.
tId cNs: Mon-Market Economies, excluding P.R. of Chine.
tgd Including livestock and flower cases.
(h) Ratio of the share in cases with respect to the share in inports.
P.A. Messertin, Montreux, 12 January 1989
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T*AO I.C. Srekdown of EC antidLopin cas by Industry 1908-1967
Coses initiated (al Css with nonnegative oute sn (b3I ISIC Description ___
Total US Japan OICs ANICs ONICs LOCs NEs Total US Japan OICs ANICs ONICS LOCS WIs|
(cl td) (el Iff (9 (cl ldl M@ ltl 191 |
-,-----,---.,---- -,------,---,1 ------ I,----,-----,--------- --,--,---,,,--,------......-..-....-.....-...................
I111 Agriculture fb 
290 Mining 9 quarrying 1.0 12.0 1.5 1S.8 1
1311/2 Food produets 1.3 13.6 4.0 2.0 20.0 S.3
I 313 sevrag
1321/2 Textiles I apporel 3.5 10.7 3.7 8.7 3.9 1.8 3.0 10.0 7.1 2.3 2.4
324 Footwer 0.3 4.2 0.5 6.7
331 iood prodxts 6.4 3.6 9.1 17.4 7.8 6.3 4.0 6.7 40.0 9.1 1.2
341 Ppor products 1.3 3.6 4.S 2.6 0.S 2.3
1351/2 Chedicals 41.S 78.6 18.5 22.7 17.4 35.1 52.0 48.6 4S.5 90.0 28.6 20.0 40.0 29.5 5T.9 S0.6
354 Petroleum coa 
I35 nub products
356 Plastic produts 
361 Pottery I chins 0.6 1.8 1.0 2.4
342 Class proAacto 4.2 4.S 2.6 9.0 6.5 6.7 4.S 12.0
369 on-mtatl produts 2.6 5.2 3.6 1.5 2.3 2.4
I 371 Iron & steel 11.2 27.3 26.0 16.0 4.5 15.0 40.0 38.6 1S.8 4.8
I 372 ont-frrow matels 3.8 3.6 3.7 9.1 2.6 8.0 3.6 0.5 1.2
I 381 Metal prodLcts 2.6 3.7 8.7 5.2 4.0 1.0 4.5 I
382 fNenltc. machinery 9.3 40.? 21.7 S.2 8.1 9.0 50.0 20.0 4.5 9.6 I
383 Electrcl eachinery S.8 25.9 4.5 26.1 1.3 2.7 2.0 7.1 3.6
I 384 Transport 0.3 1.3 0.S 2.3
385 Scientific quip. 1.6 3.7 3.6 2.5 7.1 4.8
390 Other industrles 2 - 1.3 4.0 6.3 2.5 5.3 4.8
Total (SJ 10W.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total ru*er of cass 313 28 27 22 23 77 25 111 200 20 14 1S S 44 19 83
Nerfindehl coefficients 0.21 0.63 0.27 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.82 0.3S 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.39 0.29
Exposure ratios lc0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.3 1.1 1.7 0.5 4.4 1.0 0.S 0.8 0.3 0.5 1.5 0.5 S.1
Sources: EC Official Journal. Own computations.
Notes : al] All new cases (no reviews).
fbl All fInat outcomes (affirmative, suspended, terminated ...), except rnptive outconms.
(el OICm: Other Indu triallted Countries, i.e., OECD Countries, except the EC and Japwn.
(d] ANlCs: Asien New-Indjstriatized Countries I.e., ong-Kong. Korea, Naysiax Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.
tol OhlCs: Argentina, Srazilt Chile, Mexco, Venezuelxa Israel, Portugal, Spin, Turkey, Yugoslavia.
ff] LOCs: Devwloping Countries, including P.R. of China.
bg NiEs: Ion-Market Economies, excluding P.R. of China.
(gl Including livestock and ftlower cases.
[hl Ratio of the share in cases with respect to the share in imports.
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Table 2. The close substitution of US entidu&Ping and countervailing cases 19M0-87
| Cases reakdoun by countries
Countervailing cases wnd __ , 
Antidupins cases dealing with the ... Number tXJ EC Japan OICs ANICs ONICs LOCs NNEs
All industries
1. sawe products and countries 154 43.5 55 s1 1S 5S 11 3
2. saw products but other countries S4 15.3 10 14 14 8 7 1
13. sme_ countries but close products 63 17.8 32 7 22 2
14. other products and countries 83 23.4 18 2 9 8 29 17
I All cases 354 100.0 115 2 45 37 114 37 4
I 
.I
Iron and steel ald
I. seme products and countries 103 52.6 43 9 9 38 3 1
12. swe products but other countries 41 20.9 8 11 14 3 4 1
13. sam countries but ctose products 47 24.0 21 4 21 1
14. other products and countries 5 2.6 1 2 2
All cases 196 100.0 72 1 26 23 64 8 2I I
1 All industries, iron and steel *xcluded
1I. same products and countries 51 32.3 12 6 6 17 8 2
12. sae products but other countries 13 8.2 2 3 5 3
3. same countries but close products 16 10.1 11 3 1 1
14. other products and countries 78 49.4 18 1 7 8 27 17 I
All cases 158 100.0 43 1 19 14 50 29 2!
| All industries with non-negative outcomes Eb)
categories I to 3 (number of cases) 173 74.2 51 28 16 60 15 3
i category 4 (nmber of cases) 60 25.8 10 2 5 S 27 11
All cases 233 100.0 61 2 33 21 87 26 3
categories 1 to 3 (in X of all cases) 63.8 52.6 77.8 55.2 70.6 75.0 75.0
category 4 (in X of al cases) 72.3 7 - 100.0 55.6 62.5 93.1 64.7
All cases 65.8 Sa 0 100.0 73.3 56.8 76.3 70.3 75.0
I .. .. _
Source: US Federal Register. Own computations.
Notes : (a) Iron and steel: ISIC 371.
b] All cases (affirmative, suspend d, terminated .... ) except negative.
P.A. Messerlin, Montreux, 12 January 1989
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Table 3. Evolution of the US antiduwping nd countervailing cases, 1980-87
Atl
1980 1981 1982 1983 198 1985 1986 1987 years
I i
I All cases I
I I
IAntidupin. cases 49 15 64 47 74 66 70 17 402
ICoutervailing ceses 14 23 157 28 56 40 28 8 354
ratio CZ tal 28.6 153.3 245.3 59.6 75.7 60.6 40.0 47.1 88.1
| All cases, steel excludedI ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
jAntidumping cases 14 8 14 31 20 29 54 1S 185
ICountervailing cases 12 17 38 18 30 18 22 3 158
ratio EXI Ca] 85.7 212.5 271.4 58.1 150.0 62.1 40.7 20.0 85.4
I I
All cases, steel & chemical excluded |
I I
IAntidUmping cases 6 7 10 20 15 25 46 10 139
iCowntervailing cases 12 7 32 18 26 16 19 3 133 |
ratio EXI Ea] 200.0 100.0 320.0 90.C 173.3 64.0 41.3 30.0 95.7 I
| All cases, for non-beneficiaries of the injury test in CVDs lbl E
I I
lAntiduping cases 4 2 5 10 34 24 19 0 98
ICountervailing cases 4 4 27 14 23 11 7 4 94
ratio EXI Ea] 100.0 200.0 540.0 140.0 67.6 45.8 36.8 -- 95.9
Source: Federal Register. Own conputations.
Notes Cal Countervailing cases as a percentage of antidumping cases.
Ebl Concerned non-beneficiaries: Argentina, Australia', China, Coltmbia,
Costa-Rica, Czecoslovakia, Ecuador, East-Germany, India*, Iran, Israel*,
Mexico*, New-Zealand*, Peru, Philipines', Poland, Portugal*, South Africa,
Singapore, Spain*, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, USSR and Yugoslavia.
Countries followed by a *I"' have benefited from the injury clause in
countervailing pases at one point of the time between 1980 and 1987.
P.A. Nesserlin, Montreux, 12 January 1989
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Table 4. The use of antidumping measures: the EC case, 19J0-1985
Initia-
tion year
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
-----. .. - .................. ,1
A. The evolution of the traded quantities
The decline in uduimpadM iports
"Ouped" inports ld 70.1 80.7 96.6 100.0 U2.3 72.3 64.1 61.5 49.2
The trade diversion affect |
Intra-EC trade EbI 112.6 108.7 102.0 100.0 108.9 113.4 116.1 120.7 124.0
Extra-EC imports lclI| 122.8 119.1 110.9 100.0 119.4 134.6 136.5 148.4 198.6
------ 
------------- 
----------------------------------- ------------------------------ 1
S. The evolution of the prices Edl ]
The "foreign rents effect |
0DumpedU prices j 106.7 104.2 104.2 100.0 106.6 111.6 114.5 117.3 124.4
"Nan-du.mped prices I 110.0 99.9 97.1 100.0 104.0 102.2 105.1 102.8 100.7 I
The "price mhintenance, effect I
Intra-EC prices 104.5 103.0 100.8 100.0 100.8 101.7 100.3 97.4 99.9 |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I C. Share of "dumped" imports in total extra-EC imports Cal: -
all Countries j 42.7 45.4 49.4 49.3 44.5 40.1 38.4 32.3 26.5
Industrialized Ctries ! 52.3 53.8 59.1 60.7 52.4 48.5 41.8 29.2 25.0
Developing Countries 20.5 23.5 28.0 26.8 16.9 22.3 20.8 to] teI 
Newly-Ind'd Countries I 28.8 Z0.6 28.6 29.9 25.0 18.0 10.9 Ce] tel |
Mon-Market Economies | 38.1 40.4 42.3 39.3 36.7 31.8 30.9 28.9 15.2
.................................................................................................
Source : Messertin E19891.
Notes : Ca] all cases, including cases terminated by no durping/no injury.
tbl quantities traded between the 10 Member States.
tcl imported quantities coming from non-dumpingu countries.
Ed] unit values --fn constant ECUs-- of the "dumped" imports.
(el no sufficient number of cases.
P.A. Messerlin, Montreux, 12 4anuary 1989
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Table S. Cam cses (rEC Kore. Nexico ed US) in the chOmical irdstry, 19610-8
Preots initiating Proe d- Year Defending outcome 
country urela) country lb I
Icrylonitrile fur. Cam. AD 1962 U.S.A. Meg I
gacrylonltrite U.S.A. AD 196? Jaw Aff
Iberiau chtoride fur. Cor. AD 196U fost Germany Aff
lberiU chloride fur. Con. AD 1962 China Aff
lberius chloride U.S.A. AD 1983 Chine Aff |
Icholine chloride U.S.A. AD 19U3 EC-Un.Kinaodm Me
Icholine chloride U.S.A. AD 196 Canda Aff
Ichotine chloride Eur. Can. AD 1983 Romnia Tor
Idholine chloride fur. Cam. AD 193 cost Germn Ter
icoruwd. artif1eiAl fur. Coa. AD 196 Czecolovakio Ter
|eoruadLAm artificiat fur. Car. AD 19 Yugostavia e"
Icorundm, artificial fur. Cam. AD 19 China Tor
Icorurtm, rtificiat fur. Cor. AD 1963 Spain a" I
Icoraam. artificiol fur. Cor. AD 1963 U.S.S.R. p.Ter
Icoera4, artificiat fur. Con. AD 196 ,gry p.Ter
Icorva. artificial Eur. Cor. AD 1963 Potld Tor
Icorauind rtificiat Mexico AD 196? razil 1
Idicu.vl. peroxide fur. Cam. AD 1963 Jan Aff-Tor |
Idicult. peroxide Korea AD 1906 Jn I
Idicuvl. peroxide Koreo AD 1966 Chile I
Ipoalproptal film Eur. Cam. AD 1961 Jawn Ter
Ipolyproplene, film U.S.A. CVI 1962 Nexico I
potassifU U.S.A. AD 1960 Ca I
Ipot°asl. U.S.A. AD 1964 U.S.S.R. e |
Ipotassit U.S.A. CVD 1964 Spain
IpotaSiu. U.S.A. CVD 1964 Israel
jpotaeiun U.S.A. AO 1984 East G*rmAny Tor
IPotussiumI U.S.A. AD 1984 lsraet Meg I
Ipota°eit U.S.A. CVD 1964 U.S.S.R. I
jpotasauia U.S.A. AD 1984 Spin Ter
jpotmium U.S.A. CVD 1984 Eft Germany
lpotaeeiu Mexico AD 1967 EC-Germny 
poatutiua Mexico AD 1987 U.S.A. I
jpotaeeu U.S.A. AD 1967 Canada Sue |
lpotWsiu Mexico AD 198? EC-Setgiua
IpotasfL, perm_nante U.S.A. CVD 1962 Spain |
Ipoteisa. per_mente U.S.A. AD 1983 Spain Aff
Ipotasim. ptr_mgnate U.S.A. AD 1963 China Aff
Ipotessiusm perm_nante Eur. Cam. AD 1986 China Aff-Ter
Ipotessiu., perm_gante Eur. Com. AD 1966 C2costlovakia Tar
Ipotesia, permanante Eur. Com. AD 1986 East Germany Tar
lures Eur. Com. AD 1966 Ram nia
lures U.S.A. AD 1986 Romnia Aff
lurea U.S.A. AD 1986 East Cermwny Aft
lures Eur. Cam. AD 1986 Vaezuea 
|ure U.S.A. AD 1966 U.S.S.R. Aft I
lures Eur. Coa. AD 1986 Austria I
lures Eur. Cam. AD 1966 Trinidad Tor
lures fur. Cam. AD 1966 Libya Aft 
luroo Eur. Cam. AD 1966 East Germany Tor
ures Eur. Com. AD 1966 Saudi Arabia Aft I
Iure fur. Con. AD 1966 Czecostlovkia Tar
lures Eur. Coa. AD 1966 Hunary
lures Eur. Coa. AD 1966 Yugotavia Tar
urea Eur. Com. AD 1966 U.S.S.R. Tar I
lure Eur. Cam. AD 1986 Malaysia
ures Eur. Cam. AD 1986 U.S.A.
lures Eur. Coa. AD 1966 KaAaIt Tor
lures, O AU Eur. Cam. AD 1980 U.S.A. Aff-Ter
Sourcen: IC Official Journal. Mexican Diario Oficiat. US Federal Register;
GATT docmemnts for Korea.
Notes : CaI AD: antidumping procedure; CVD: countervailing procedure.
tbl Aff: affirmative Nleg: negative, Ter: terminated (various measures),
p.Ter: partially terminated. Sus: susped.
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Annex
Figure 1 illustrates gains from collusion if there are spillover
effects due to subsidies.
Before the creation of Airbus, the curve mc is the marginal cost of
Boeing and, P the corresponding monopoly price charged by Boeing. The
corresponding Boeing profit is illustrated by PQRS, with ac the average cost.
Let us assume that the existence of Airbus --due to subsidies-- allow
scale economies in producing some parts, for instance engines. With the same
initial fixed cost, the marginal cost for the whole industry is now s0own by
MC and the price charged by the cartel Boeing-Airbus is illustrated by K. The
marginal cost for Boeing alone is mc' mirroring the decreaps in input prices
and the corresponding total profit of Boeing is illustrated by KLMN, with ac'
the corresponding average cost for Boeing.
KLMN can be smeller or larger then PQRS. In the last case, Boeing
has no incentive to lodge a countervailing action. It is induced to work out
an agreement with Airbus in order to agree on the collusive price K.
A
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